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THE NURSING STANDARD OF CARE IN ILLINOIS: RETHINKING THE




Medical malpractice cases turn on whether a medical profession-
al's conduct comported with the professional standard of care. Gener-
ally, while medical professionals are not liable for any adverse results
that occur when their conduct meets or exceeds the minimum stand-
ard of care, they are liable when their deviation from that standard
causes a patient harm.1 Accordingly, establishing the standard of care
is a crucial element in any medical malpractice lawsuit.
At trial, each party must present expert testimony in order to es-
tablish the applicable standard of care.2 In most areas of law, Illinois
courts do not require experts to hold any specific licenses; rather, the
attorneys may question expert witnesses about their licensure in order
to bolster their credibility or place it in doubt.3 In medical malpractice
cases, however, Illinois courts require medical experts to be licensed in
the school of medicine about which they plan to testify.4 The Illinois
Supreme Court articulated this rule in Purtill v. Hess, stating that when
an expert medical witness seeks to establish the standard of care, "[i]t
must be established that the expert is a licensed member of the school
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013; B.A., University of Chicago, 2010. I would like
to thank Professor Kent Streseman, Jack Kennedy, Linda Chen and Eric Chase-Sosnoff for their
valuable guidance and comments.
1. There are certain specified tort theories, such as res ipsa loquitur, which do not specifi-
cally address whether the defendant's actions breached the standard of care. However, straight-
forward medical malpractice cases revolve around four basic elements: duty, breach, causation,
and damages. If the medical practitioner breached his duty to act within the standard of care, and
this breach caused the patient harm, then that practitioner would be liable for the cost of that
harm.
2. Walski v. Tiesenga, 381 N.E.2d 279, 282 (Ill. 1978); Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d
301, 304-05 (1ll. 1975). See also Ill. Pattern Jury Instr.-Civ. 105.01 (2011). These cases state that
expert testimony, and not just lay opinion testimony, must be used in order to establish the stand-
ard of care in medical malpractice cases. In practice, this means that each side must present
experts to explain to the jury what they believe the professional standard to be.
3. ILL. R. EVID. 702.
4. Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (lll. 1986).
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of medicine about which he proposes to express an opinion, and the
expert witness must show that he is familiar with the methods, proce-
dures, and treatments ordinarily observed by other physicians, in ei-
ther the defendant physician's community or a similar community."s
Illinois courts have aptly applied this rule to the nursing profes-
sion. When a nurse is a defendant in a medical malpractice case, only a
licensed nurse may testify to the nursing standard of care; the testimo-
ny of a physician may not establish this standard.6 In 1997, however,
the Illinois Appellate Court carved out an exception to this rule in
Wingo ex rel. Wingo v. Rockford Memorial Hospital.7 According to this
exception, in the limited situation of establishing the standard of care
for communications between nurses and physicians, a physician may
testify as to what information a nurse must disclose and how the nurse
must convey that information to the physician.o
In 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the Purtill licensing
requirement for expert medical testimony in Sullivan v. Edward Hospi-
tal. The Sullivan court noted the Wingo exception, but neither over-
ruled nor endorsed it. This ruling has created confusion among the
lower courts about whether the Wingo exception still stands, and if so,
in what situations it may apply. It is important that Illinois courts cre-
ate a single rule to resolve this tension because the different opinions
about how Wingo and Sullivan interact have wildly different implica-
tions for how lawyers practice law and how nurses and physicians
communicate on the hospital floor. Since the Sullivan ruling, however,
the districts of the Illinois Appellate Court have proffered three sepa-
rate views on how to interpret Wingo in light of Sullivan.
This note first reviews the history of the medical licensing re-
quirement and the policy rationale supporting it. Next, this note exam-
ines the three-way split among the appellate districts and analyzes the
implications of each rule for nurses and legal practitioners. Finally, this
note advocates for a strict application of the original licensing re-
quirement, contending that the best interpretation of Sullivan com-
pletely overrules the Wingo exception and restores the rule that only a
nurse may testify to the nursing standard of care.
5. Id. (internal citations omitted).
6. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Edward Hosp., 806 N.E.2d 645, 657-58 (Ill. 2004).
7. Wingo ex rel. Wingo v. Rockford Mem] Hosp., 686 N.E.2d 722 (lll. App. Ct. 1997).
8. Id. at 729.
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I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE WINGO/SULLIVAN SPLIT
Over the past quarter-century, Illinois courts have struggled to
adopt a unified rule concerning which expert witnesses may testify to
the standard of care for medical professionals. This section will high-
light and explain three major developments in the rule's evolution: the
establishment of licensure requirements in Dolan; the Wingo exception
allowing physicians to testify about the standard of care for nurse-
doctor communications; and the Sullivan ruling, which may have abol-
ished the Wingo exception.
A. The Licensing Requirement
In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed licensing require-
ments for experts offering medical testimony in Dolan v. Galluzzo.9 This
was an issue of first impression in Illinois.io In that case, the plaintiff
patient brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant, a
podiatrist licensed under Illinois law.11 The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant had negligently performed an osteotomy, a surgical bone
cutting, on the plaintiffs left foot.12 On appeal, the primary issue was
whether the plaintiff could offer expert testimony by a non-podiatrist
physician or surgeon in order to establish what standard of care the
podiatrist owed his patient.13
The Dolan court ruled that in medical malpractice cases, the par-
ties must establish the appropriate standard of care for a particular
professional by offering expert testimony from a licensed member of
that professional community.14 The court looked to state law in reach-
ing this conclusion, explaining that the state has "long recognized po-
diatrists as a separate and distinct profession of healers who are
severely limited in their practice and whose educational requirements
are substantially different than those of physicians."is The court rec-
ognized several distinct categories of medical practices as determined
by Illinois regulatory statutes: for example, medicine and surgery,
9. Dolan v. Galluzzo, 396 N.E.2d 13 (lll. 1979).
10. Id at 15.
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id.
13. Id at 15.
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id at 15.
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nursing, pharmacy, dental surgery, and podiatry.16 The court empha-
sized that these different medical professions require different training
and are guided by different philosophies of care and methods of treat-
ment.17 Considering fairness, the court also recognized that allowing
physicians or surgeons to testify to the podiatry standard of care could
unfairly impose a higher standard of care on podiatrists.18 Therefore,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that in malpractice cases, the "defend-
ant has the right to have his competence judged by the standards of his
own distinct profession and not by those of any other."19
The crux of the Dolan decision rests on the fact that science and
medicine are constantly evolving and that the standard of care changes
in response to new discoveries. If all medical professionals are allowed
to testify to any other medical professional's standard of care, this
falsely assumes that all schools of thought "have achieved a universal
standard of treatment of disease or injury."20 In the absence of any
"universal medical method," courts may only trust a licensed member
of a particular group to testify about that group's training, methods,
and general standard of care.21
Applying the Dolan rule, Illinois courts have developed a three-
part test to determine whether a health professional may testify to a
defendant's standard of care. The expert witness must meet two foun-
dational requirements: (1) she must be a licensed member of the
school of medicine about which she plans to testify, and (2) she must
be familiar with the methods, procedures, and treatments normally
performed in the defendant's professional community.22 If an expert
passes these two tests, the analysis moves to the third step, in which
the trial court judge determines whether the proffered expert is com-
petent to testify in the case at hand.23 This three-part test is called the
"Purtill foundational test," because the Illinois Supreme Court articu-
lated the first two steps in Purtill v. Hess.24 Today, Illinois courts still
16. Id at 16. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25 (West 2012) (Illinois Dental Practice Act);
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60 (West 2012) (Medical Practice Act of 1987); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
65 (West 1998) (Nurse Practice Act); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85 (West 2012) (Pharmacy Prac-
tice Act); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100 (West 2012) (Podiatric Medical Practice Act of 1987).
17. Dolan, 396 N.E.2d at 15.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id at 15.
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id.
22. Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (111.1986).
23. Alm v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., 866 N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (lil. App. Ct. 2007).
24. Purtill, 489 N.E.2d at 872-73. See also Petryshyn v. Slotky, 902 N.E.2d 709, 715 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008) (using the term "Purtill foundational test").
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use this test; however, a myriad of exceptions threaten to undermine
the foundations of the licensing rule.
B. The Wingo Exception
In 1997, a medical malpractice case in the Second District changed
the way Illinois courts perceive the Dolan licensing rule. In that case,
Wingo ex rel. Wingo v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, the plaintiff sued
the hospital where she gave birth, claiming that the negligence of the
hospital's nursing staff proximately caused her daughter's brain dam-
age.25
The facts of Wingo are as follows. The plaintiff, who was approxi-
mately thirty-five weeks pregnant, went to the hospital at 5:00 a.m.
because she was leaking fluid.26 At the hospital, she continued to leak
fluid for several hours, and a physician concluded that her bag of wa-
ters was the source of the leak.27 This continuous leaking was noted on
the plaintiffs nursing chart.28 At 9:30 a.m., Nurse Weldon and Dr. Klink
took over the plaintiffs case.29 Dr. Klink examined the plaintiff, and at
the time of the exam, she did not leak any fluid.3o Dr. Klink left and
Nurse Weldon resumed monitoring the plaintiff.31 The nurse observed
that the plaintiff continued to leak intermittently all morning.32
At 2:45 p.m., Dr. Klink spoke with Nurse Weldon on the phone.33
Nurse Weldon later stated that she would have told Dr. Klink that the
plaintiff exhibited "no change."34 Dr. Klink interpreted the statement
''no change" to mean that the plaintiff had not leaked fluid since the
time that he examined her.3s However, Nurse Weldon meant to convey
that the plaintiff had intermittently leaked fluid since her admission to
the hospital several hours earlier.36 After this exchange, Dr. Klink re-
leased the plaintiff from the hospital.37 When the plaintiff later gave
birth, doctors discovered that her bag of waters had become infected










35. Id. at 726.




from the leaking rupture, and that this untreated infection caused the
plaintiffs baby to suffer severe and irreversible brain damage.38
At trial, the plaintiff presented three physicians to testify about
Nurse Weldon's standard of care in communicating the plaintiffs con-
dition to Dr. Klink.39 All three physicians concluded that the nurse had
breached the standard of care because they would have taken "no
change" to mean no change since the physician's last examination of
the plaintiff.40 The defendant hospital, however, presented the expert
testimony of two nurses, both of whom testified that Nurse Weldon
appropriately reported the situation given the nursing standard of
care.41 The hospital objected to the physicians' testimony regarding
the nursing standard. Invoking Dolan, the hospital argued that a physi-
cian who was not also a licensed nurse was unqualified to testify about
practices in the nursing field of medicine.42
Rather than barring the physicians' testimony, the appellate court
carved out a limited exception to the Dolan rule: when the standard of
care in question governs the communications between a nurse and a
physician, a physician may testify about the applicable standard of
care.43 To justify this exception to the rule, the court noted that the
concerns at issue in Dolan did not apply to the case at hand. First, the
Dolan licensing requirement prevents courts from unfairly imposing
higher standards of care on professional defendants.44 Second, the
Dolan rule ensures that expert witnesses are familiar with the training,
procedures, and treatment philosophies of the relevant medical
school.45 The Wingo court reasoned that the current case did not im-
plicate either of these policy concerns.46 The allegedly negligent con-
duct was not a nursing procedure, but rather a required
communication from nurse to physician. As such, the court concluded,
"the allegations of negligence do not concern an area of medicine about
which there would be a different standard between physician and an-
other school of medicine."47 Therefore, since the communication in-
volves both parties, the Wingo court reasoned that (1) physicians
38. Id.
39. Id. at 727.
40. Id.
41. Id at 726.
42. Id. at 727.
43. Id. at 729.
44. Id. See also Dolan v. Galluzzo, 396 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ill. 1979).
45. Wingo, 686 N.E.2d at 729. See also Dolan, 396 N.E.2d at 15.




would not impose unfairly high standards on nurses, and (2) physi-
cians are familiar with the nursing procedures regarding nurse-doctor
communicationS.48
In sum, the Wingo exception states that when the alleged negli-
gence involves a misunderstood communication from a nurse to a phy-
sician, the parties may present expert testimony from physicians,
without input from nurses, to establish whether that communication
met the standard of care. Specifically, physicians may instruct the jury
as to what information nurses are required to disclose to them and
may specify the manner in which nurses must disclose this information
in order for physicians to properly understand, regardless of whether
these opinions diverge from the nursing profession's standard of care
for communications.
C. The Sullivan Ruling
In 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Sullivan v. Edward
Hospital, the crux of which was a phone communication between a
nurse and a physician.49 In that case, the plaintiff was a stroke pa-
tient.so The plaintiff had been instructed not to leave his hospital bed,
but the nurse on duty, Nurse Lewis, observed that the plaintiff at-
tempted to get up and walk several times.si The plaintiff seemed agi-
tated and was not able to follow the nurse's instructions to stay in
bed.52 Concerned, Nurse Lewis phoned the plaintiffs physician, Dr.
Conte-Russian, and asked her to order a "posey vest" to restrain the
plaintiff to his bed.53 Dr. Conte-Russian advised that a restraining de-
vice might further agitate the plaintiff, and she instead prescribed a
calming drug to help the plaintiff sleep.54 After Nurse Lewis adminis-
tered the drug, she later found the plaintiff lying on the floor of his
hospital room with a pool of blood surrounding his head.ss
At trial, the plaintiff alleged that both Dr. Conte-Russian and Nurse
Lewis failed to meet their respective standards of care. The plaintiff
called a physician witness, Dr. Barnhart, to testify that Nurse Lewis
was negligent in not properly communicating the plaintiffs condition
48. Id
49. Sullivan v. Edward Hosp., 806 N.E.2d 645, 650 (111. 2004).
50. Id. at 648.
51. Id at 648-49.






to the physician over the phone when requesting the posey vest.56
However, since the plaintiff did not properly disclose this aspect of Dr.
Barnhart's testimony in pretrial discovery, Illinois Supreme Court Rule
213 precluded Dr. Barnhart from offering his opinion on the nursing
standard of care for communicating a patient's condition.57 The Illinois
Supreme Court thus declined to rule specifically on the validity of the
Wingo exception, stating, "the appellate court did not discuss the mer-
its of Wingo, and neither do we."sa
For other allegations concerning Nurse Lewis's negligence, the Il-
linois Supreme Court followed the Dolan licensing rule. The court thus
refused to allow physician testimony about standard nursing proce-
dures and methods, and instead required the parties to establish the
nursing standard of care through the testimony of nurse expert wit-
nesses.59
After re-affirming the Dolan rule, the Sullivan court bolstered its
position by explaining the policy rationale for maintaining strict licens-
ing requirements. The core of this policy argument was that the di-
verse schools of medicine have not yet reached a universal
understanding of treatment.6o Given this premise, the court acknowl-
edged that both the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois legislature
have recognized nursing as a profession that is distinct from, and not
subordinate to, that of physicians. The court further emphasized that
nurses are not merely physicians' assistants. It rejected the contention
made in the amicus brief by the Trial Lawyers' Association that "[tihere
is nothing which a nurse can do which a doctor cannot do."61 Not only
did that assertion wrongly assume that the medical fields have reached
a universal understanding, but it also reflected ignorance of the mod-
ern state of the nursing profession.
Quoting a scholarly article, the Sullivan court stated, "nursing, as a
profession, has moved beyond its former dependence on the physician,
and into a realm where it must and can legally account for its own pro-
fessional practices."62 The court noted that physicians rarely teach in
nursing programs or write the content in nursing texts, both of which
56. Id. at 649-50.
57. Id at 652.
58. Id at 657.
59. Id 657-58.
60. Id at 658.
61. Id. at 659.
62. Id. (quoting Carole F. Kehoe, Contemporary Nursing Roles and Legal Accountability: The
Challenge of Nursing Malpractice for the Law Librarian, 79 LAw LIBR. J. 419, 428 (1987)).
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heavily influence nurses' understanding of their profession's standard
of care.63 Quoting another scholarly journal, the court wrote, "In many
situations, a physician would not be familiar with the standard of care
or with nursing policies and procedures which govern the standard of
care."64 The Sullivan court thus re-established the rule that physicians
may not testify to the nursing standard of care because doing so would
falsely assume that nurses and physicians have reached a common
understanding of the methods, procedures, and science of patient
treatment.
Most notably, although the Sullivan court stated that it would not
address the merits of Wingo, one statement in its policy analysis indi-
cates that there is no room for the Wingo exception in the post-Sullivan
world. Quoting the American Association of Nurse Attorneys (TAANA),
the court stated that a nurse could not testify "that, in her experience,
when she calls a physician, he/she usually responds in a certain man-
ner. Such testimony would be, essentially, expert testimony as to the
standard of medical care."65
This statement contains two distinct assertions that place the Sul-
livan ruling in tension with the Wingo exception. First, it asserts that
communications made as part of a medical professional's job fall with-
in that professional's standard of care. Therefore, when nurses convey
information to physicians, this communication would fall within the
nursing standard of care and would not be governed by a different
standard as the Wingo exception allows. Second, this statement de-
clares that it would be improper for a nurse to testify that, when she
calls a physician, the physician usually responds in a certain manner.
Since nurses and physicians are equal but distinct professions under
the licensing rule, the inverse should also be true: it would be improp-
er for a physician to testify that a nurse usually relays information to
him in a certain manner. Yet, this prohibited testimony is precisely
what the Wingo exception allows.
Despite these strong implications that Sullivan should be read to
overturn Wingo, the lower courts have reached different conclusions
about whether Wingo is still good law, and if so, in which situations it
63. Sullivan, 806 N.E.2d at 658-59 (quoting Elizabeth Webb Beyer & Pamela W. Popp, Nurs-
ing Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Role of the Nurse Expert Witness, 23 1.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 363, 365 (1990)).
64. Id. at 659.
65. Sullivan, 806 N.E.2d at 658 (quoting Amicus Curiae Br. for the American Association of
Nurse Attorneys (TAANA) in Support of Defendant/Respondent Edward Hospital, No. 95409
(2002) (hereinafter Sullivan Amicus Brief)).
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applies. As a result, there is currently no clear rule in Illinois regarding
expert testimony for nurse-doctor communications. Instead, the dis-
tricts of the Illinois Appellate Court have put forth three contradictory
rulings on the Wingo/Sullivan rule.66
II. THE NATURE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In the wake of Sullivan, Illinois courts have struggled to reconcile
the Wingo exception with the Sullivan court's renewed endorsement of
the strict licensing requirements. There are three prominent theories
on how to interpret the intersection of the Wingo and Sullivan rules.
First, a lenient application of Sullivan not only preserves the Wingo
exception, but also extends it. Under this approach, a doctor may testi-
fy to the nursing standard of care as long as that doctor is familiar with
normal nursing procedures. For example, a doctor may testify about
nursing procedures that are performed as part of a surgical team in
which doctors and nurses collaborate.67 Second, on the opposite end of
the spectrum, proponents of a strict application of Sullivan reason that,
in endorsing the Dolan licensing requirement, the Sullivan court over-
ruled the Wingo exception. Under this approach, each party must pre-
sent a licensed nurse to establish the standard of care for all nursing
procedures, including nurse-doctor communications.68 This approach
endorses the view that since required communications are an integral
part of nursing procedure, and since physicians' expectations may dif-
fer from nurses' requirements, only a licensed nurse can properly in-
struct the jury on a nurse's proper method of communication. Finally, a
moderate application of Sullivan would preserve Wingo but decline to
extend the exception any further. Under this approach, doctors may
testify to the nursing standard only as it relates to information that a
nurse is required to disclose to a doctor.69 This section will analyze
each approach, focusing specifically on how each one balances the dual
interests of protecting patients and ensuring that nurse defendants are
judged fairly in court.
66. For the first interpretation ("the lenient approach"), see Petryshyn v. Slotky, 902 N.E.2d
709 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). For the second interpretation ("the moderate approach"), see Petre v.
Cardiovascular Consultants, 871 N.E.2d 780 (1ll. App. Ct. 2007). For the third interpretation ("the
strict approach"), see Garley v. Columbia LaGrange Mem'l Hosp., 13 N.E.2d 1030 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004).
67. For a discussion of the lenient approach, see infra pp. 255-58.
68. For a discussion of the strict approach, see infra pp. 258-62.
69. For a discussion of the moderate approach, see infra pp. 262-66.
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A. The Lenient Approach
The most lenient application of Sullivan adopted by the lower
courts allows physicians to testify to the nursing standard of care when
the defendant nurse worked on a surgical team. The physician's testi-
mony need not be related to communications. Rather, if a team of phy-
sicians and nurses has worked on a patient during surgery, a physician
may testify to the standard of care of any nursing procedure typically
performed during that surgery. Therefore, this lenient approach not
only leaves the Wingo exception intact, but also expands its breadth to
cover any nursing procedure performed in a setting where physicians
and nurses would usually communicate.
This approach abandons the first foundational requirement of the
Dolan licensing test (that the expert must be a licensed member of the
relevant school of medicine), as long as the second foundational re-
quirement is met (that the expert is familiar with the methods, proce-
dures, and treatments of the relevant school). While this rule likely
preserves the goals of tort law, it places an unfair burden on surgical
team nurses to act in accordance with what surgeons, rather than oth-
er nurses, consider to be the nursing standard of care. Since nurses
have no way of knowing what surgeons consider the nursing standard
to be, this rule imposes on nurses a request that is nearly impossible to
meet.
The Fourth District has endorsed this lenient approach in
Petryshyn v. Slotky.70 In that case, the plaintiff brought a medical mal-
practice action against her obstetrician and hospital when she discov-
ered 11.3 centimeters of an intrauterine pressure catheter (IUPC)71 left
inside her body several months after having a Cesarean section (C-
section).72
At trial, the plaintiffs expert witness explained that during C-
sections, surgical teams of physicians and nurses work together and
perform different necessary tasks.73 Normally, the nurses would re-
move the IUPC from the patient's birth canal before the start of the C-
70. 902 N.E.2d 709 (111. App. Ct. 2008).
71. IUPCs are used to monitor the progression of labor and uterine contractions. Id. at 711.
For more detail, see Robin Elise Weiss, Intrauterine Pressure Catheter (IUPC), ABouT.coM
PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH, http://pregnancy.about.com/od/laborglossary/g/iupc.htm (last visited
Feb. 3, 2012). When contractions do not progress normally, a doctor may order a C-section.
Petryshyn, 902 N.E.2d at 710.
72. Petryshyn, 902 N.E.2d at 710.
73. Id. at 716.
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section.74 In this case, the nurses did not do so, and the IUPC was cut in
half while the doctor made the abdominal incision to remove the
child.7s Expert testimony also showed that if the nurses had not previ-
ously removed the IUPC, they would normally do so right after the C-
section during the postoperative "sponge and instrument count" and
would check to make sure that the entire device was removed.76 In this
case, the nurses did remove part of the IUPC, but since it had been cut
during the surgery, another part of the IUPC remained in the patient.77
The nurses did not report to the doctor that the discarded IUPC was
not intact.78 Expert testimony also showed that at the end of the pro-
cedure, the physician standard of care requires the physician who per-
formed the C-section to examine the patient's birth canal to ensure that
the nurses properly removed all of the surgical equipment.79 In this
case, the physician failed to check the birth canal.8o
The Petryshyn court ruled that a physician expert witness may tes-
tify to the standard of care for every medical professional on the surgi-
cal team.81 The court reasoned that the Wingo exception should be
expanded to cover the situation at hand in the case: "Wingo relieves a
party of satisfying the licensing prong of the Purtill foundational test82
when the allegations of negligence concern communications between
members of different schools of medicine acting as part of the same
team."83 The court emphasized, however, that Wingo only relieves the
expert of satisfying the licensing prong.84 The expert must still prove
that she is familiar with the responsibilities, training, and methods of
the school of medicine for which she seeks to offer testimony.85
Most importantly, the Petryshyn court proposed that Illinois
courts use a "providing-medical-care continuum" to guide their rulings
on medical testimony in future cases.86 According to this analysis, Do-
lan represents one extreme of the continuum, in which a practitioner,
74. Id. at 711.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 716.
77. Id. at 711.
78. Id. at 711-12.
79. Id. at 711.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 716-17.
82. See supra pp. 245-46 (explaining the three-part Purtill foundation test).
83. Petryshyn, 902 N.E.2d at 715 (quoting Petre v. Cardiovascular Consultants, 871 N.E.2d
780, 792 (111. App. Ct. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
84. Id. at 715.
85. Id
86. Id at 715-16.
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unlicensed in podiatry and without any knowledge of that school's
methods and training, sought to offer expert testimony about the podi-
atry standard of care. This type of testimony, Petryshyn conceded,
should still be prohibited.87 However, the court reasoned that the
Petryshyn case represented the opposite extreme of the spectrum, in
which an expert is intimately familiar with the methods and require-
ments of another school of medicine because that expert has worked in
a team setting with and among members of that school. According to
this analysis, a surgical team is a complete organism, and any member
of the team may testify to the responsibilities of any other team mem-
ber. In fact, the Petryshyn court insisted that it was even more reason-
able for the court to admit differently-licensed expert testimony in a
team setting than in the communications setting presented in Wingo.a8
The lenient approach succeeds in promoting the tort law goal of
deterring potential tortfeasors. In jurisdictions applying this approach,
medical professionals working in a team setting would be aware that
their competence could be judged by any other category of licensed
professional on that team. Therefore, all of the professionals involved
would be more likely to ensure that every team member understood
and accurately communicated every action taken. A new standard of
care might emerge in which each team member checks the work of
every other person, so that a team truly does function as a complete
organism. For example, in the Petryshyn scenario, the physician might
have been required to ask the nurses if they had removed the entire
IUPC, and the nurses might have been required to ask the physician if
he had checked the birth canal after the operation. In this way, team
members would be deterred from remaining silent in the face of un-
clear information and would have affirmative incentives to check the
work of other team members, possibly reducing the number of injuries
in the future.
However, any team cohesion enhanced by the lenient approach
comes at a high price for nurse defendants in terms of fairness. Illinois
courts and legislatures have long recognized nursing as a profession
completely separate from that of physicians. To assume that a physi-
cian is familiar with the methods, procedures, and treatments of nurs-
es simply by virtue of working alongside them is akin to assuming that
anyone who has closely observed a medical professional's work in a
team setting may testify to that professional's standard of care. Assum-
87. Id. at 715.
88. Id. at 716.
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ing, as the courts and legislatures have, that nurses are separate, but
not inferior to, physicians, this standard would allow operating room
nurses to testify to surgeons' standards of care. The implications of
such a ruling border on the absurd. Could a doula89 who attends a birth
establish the standard of care of a licensed nurse midwife or obstetri-
cian? Could a doctor's unlicensed assistant, or even a frequent patient,
testify to that doctor's standard simply because of close observation?
In short, the lenient approach sacrifices fairness for nurse defendants
by assuming, without supporting data, that close observation in a team
setting is sufficient to satisfy the licensing prong of the Purtill founda-
tional test.
B. The Strict Approach
Under a strict application of Sullivan, courts would interpret the
Sullivan ruling to completely abolish the Wingo exception and restore
the Dolan licensing requirements to their original status. This ap-
proach defers to the policy rationale in Dolan by recognizing that al-
lowing differently-licensed medical professionals to testify about
standards of care could result in courts holding professional defend-
ants to unfairly high standards. The strict approach therefore only al-
lows licensed professionals to establish the standard of care for their
own professions, regardless of whether the standard at issue pertains
to a procedure or a method of communication. Unfortunately, plaintiffs
would not be compensated if their injuries resulted from ineffective
nurse-doctor communications where both the nurses and physicians
met their respective minimum standards of care. However, if these
situations arise, the appropriate response is to revise the standard of
care in order to close these communication gaps. It is not appropriate
for physicians, at trial, to hold nurses to a standard of care that is more
rigorous than the standard governing those nurses' training and prac-
tice. Such a rule is especially unfair because the reverse would not be
true - nurse experts would not be allowed to testify that the physi-
cian's understanding of the nurse's oral report fell below the physician
standard of care. Accordingly, a strict application of Sullivan is the only
approach that safeguards fairness for professional defendants while
89. Doulas are birthing coaches. WebMD states, "A doula... [is] not a doctor, not a nurse, not
a midwife. Indeed, a doula (a Greek word meaning 'women supporting women') is not a medical
professional at all. Rather, she provides support and encouragement throughout labor and deliv-
ery, and often, after the baby is born, as well." Star Lawrence, Doulas: Easing Birth, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/baby/features/doulas-easing-birth (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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still allowing plaintiffs to recover where defendants have breached
their true standards of care.
In Garley v. Columbia LaGrange Memorial Hospital, the First Dis-
trict embraced this strict application of Sullivan.9o The facts of that case
began when Pauline Garley went to the hospital for several abdominal
surgeries.91 When the surgeries were completed at 1:30 p.m. on April
28, her treating physician mandated that she be "ambulated with assis-
tance" to decrease the likelihood of developing a deep vein thrombosis
(DVT).92 Later that afternoon, a nurse attempted to ambulate Ms. Gar-
ley, but Ms. Garley could not tolerate it.93 The next day, beginning at 11
a.m., Ms. Garley walked three short distances of about ten feet each.94
The following day, when a nurse attempted to help Ms. Garley ambu-
late, she collapsed and subsequently died.95 A medical examiner later
concluded that Ms. Garley had died from a pulmonary embolism
caused by a DVT.96
Ms. Garley's husband brought a wrongful death suit against the
hospital. At trial, the court instructed the jury on five theories of negli-
gence against the hospital's nursing staff.97 Three of these theories
alleged improper nurse-doctor communications: "[1] failing to notify
her physicians of her complaints of pain... [2] failing to notify her
physicians of her lack of ambulation ... [and 3] failing to suggest the
use of anticlotting devices during surgery."98
At trial, the plaintiff called three expert witnesses to establish the
nursing standard of care. All three of these experts were physicians
90. Garley v. Columbia LaGrange Mem'1 Hosp., 813 N.E.2d 1030 (111. App. Ct. 2004). Note that
the First District overturned this ruling in Petre v. Cardiovascular Consultants, 871 N.E.2d 780 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007).
91. Garley, 813 N.E.2d at 1032.
92. Id. at 1032-33. WebMD states the following information about DVT: "Deep vein throm-
bosis (DVT) occurs when a blood clot forms in a vein deep inside a muscle in your body. It usually
happens in the legs, but can also develop in your arms, chest, or other areas of your body. And
though DVT is common, it can be dangerous. The blood clot can block your circulation or lodge in
a blood vessel in your lungs, brain, heart, or other area. The clot can cause severe organ damage
and even death - within hours." Causes of Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT), WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/dvt/deep-vein-thrombosis-causes-are-you-risk-dvt (last visited Nov.
16, 2012).
93. Garley, 813 N.E.2d at 1033.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (the medical examiner explained that Ms. Garley had developed a DVT, which had
"dislodged and traveled through her bloodstream, blocking her pulmonary arteries"). For more
information on DVT, see supra, note 92.
97. Id. at 1035.
98. Id. at 1035-36.
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without nursing licenses.99 First, Dr. Charles Bird testified that his ex-
perience working with nurses made him familiar with "the standard of
care applicable to nurses who perform postoperative care on patients
who have undergone [similar] surgeries."loo He testified that the nurs-
es in this case should have ambulated Ms. Garley within 12 hours of
surgery, and that their failure to do so contributed to her death.1o
Second, Dr. Fred Duboe testified that he was familiar with the nursing
profession because he had taught nurses, married a nurse, and occa-
sionally read Nursing Spectrums, a nursing periodical.102 Dr. Duboe
testified that the nurses in this case should have ambulated Ms. Garley
within 12 to 18 hours of surgery, for a distance of about 60 feet, and
that if they could not accomplish this, they should have called Ms. Gar-
ley's treating physician for further instructions.103 He asserted that the
nurses' failure to do any of this was a deviation from the nursing
standard of care.104 Finally, Dr. Richard Vasquez testified that he had
taught nurses and worked with nursing personnel "in the formation of
guides as to what nurses are supposed to do."los He stated that, in this
case, the operating room nurse deviated from the nursing standard of
care by failing to advise Ms. Garley's surgeon to use anticlotting devices
during the operation.106 The surgeon's subsequent failure to use anti-
clotting devices, he testified, "set the ball rolling toward [the develop-
ment of a] DVT and pulmonary embolus."1o7
The hospital, in contrast, presented a registered nurse as their ex-
pert witness to establish the nursing standard of care.108 This nurse
expert, Jacqueline Medland, stated that Ms. Garley should have been
ambulated "as soon as she was able to tolerate it, but no later than 24
hours after surgery."lo9 She concluded that the nurses on duty had met
the standard of care by walking Ms. Garley to the chair in her hospital
room at 11 a.m. on April 29.11o Since these nurses had met the stand-




103. Id. at 1034-35.
104. Id.








ard of care, they would not have needed to contact Ms. Garley's treat-
ing physician for alternate instructions.
The Garley court ultimately decided that only a nurse can establish
the nursing standard of care. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice cases. Since the
plaintiff in Garley had not offered a nurse's testimony to establish the
standard of care, he lost the case by failing to prove this element of the
tort.
In reaching its decision, the court made no distinction between the
plaintiffs claims based on nursing procedures and his claims based on
failed nurse-doctor communications; rather, the court held that all of
the claims required the expert testimony of a licensed nurse. The court
stated, "It is undisputed that, in this case, plaintiffs experts were well-
qualified physicians, whose professional experience and accomplish-
ments were beyond reproach. Equally undisputed, however, is that
none of plaintiffs experts were licensed in the school of nursing."111
The court further emphasized that a court should only consider the
second prong of the Purtill foundational test (the familiarity prong)
once the first prong (the licensing prong) has been met. So, in Garley,
the expert physicians' familiarity with nursing practice was inconse-
quential: "[a]n expert physician who is not licensed in the particular
school of medicine about which he intends to testify is automatically
incompetent; his knowledge, experience, and level of expertise, no
matter how extensive, are simply irrelevant."112 Since nursing is a dis-
tinctly licensed medical profession, and the plaintiff did not offer a
nurse's testimony to set the standard of care, the plaintiff failed to pre-
sent a complete case to the jury.
The Garley court based its analysis on both the text of the Sullivan
opinion and enduring policy considerations. First, it reasoned that the
Illinois Supreme Court had unequivocally restored the Dolan licensing
requirements: "the court in Sullivan reiterated the requirement that, in
order to provide competent standard of care testimony, the plaintiffs
proffered expert physician must be licensed in the defendant's given
school of medicine."113 The Garley court reasoned that, since Sullivan
had reaffirmed the same-license requirement across the board, the
Wingo exception no longer applied. The court wrote, "[a]s our supreme
court has made clear, '[wie expressly reaffirm the license requirement
111. Id.at 1038.
112. Id. at 1042 (citing Sullivan v. Edward Hosp., 806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004)).
113. Garley, 813 N.E.2d at 1037 (citing Sullivan, 806 N.E.2d at 653-54).
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of Dolan and its progeny and decline plaintiffs invitation to deviate
therefrom."'114 Therefore, invoking stare decisis, the court determined
that it must affirm the Sullivan and Dolan licensing requirements with-
out exception.115
Next, the Garley court began its policy analysis by acknowledging
that both the Illinois Supreme Court and the state legislature have rec-
ognized nursing as a distinct school of medicine.116 Since these schools
are unique, allowing a doctor to testify to the nursing standard of care
would improperly assume that doctors and nurses have reached a uni-
versal standard of treatment.117 The Sullivan court itself rejected the
idea that "[t]here is nothing which a nurse can do which a doctor can-
not do" because it presumes the fantasy of a universal standard.118
Therefore, since a nurse-doctor communication is a communication
spanning two distinct professions, it would be unfair to allow one of
those professions to dictate the required terms of the interaction. In
short, the Garley court concluded that Sullivan had already answered
any remaining doubts about expert testimony - a nurse expert is al-
ways required to establish the nursing standard of care.
C. The Moderate Approach
A moderate application of the Sullivan ruling recognizes the Wingo
exception as it relates to nurse-doctor communications, but refuses to
extend the exception to any other scenarios, such as the surgical team
scenario presented in Petryshyn. Under this approach, courts must
follow the three-part Purtill foundational test in every situation except
when dealing with communications covered by the limited Wingo ex-
ception. Courts that have adopted this approach reason that a nurse-
doctor communication is not a nursing procedure, and therefore the
114. Id. at 1040 (quoting Sullivan, 806 N.E.2d at 660).
115. Id. ("[rligid and formalistic though this rule may be, it is fundamental to our judicial
system that once our supreme court has declared the law on any point, this court must follow that
law, as only the supreme court has authority to overrule or modify its own decisions") (citing
Schiffner v. Motorola, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ("the doctrine of stare decisis
requires courts to follow the decisions of higher courts")).
116. Id. at 1038-39. See also Nursing and Advanced Practice Nursing Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
65/5-1 (2000) (establishes a distinct licensing and regulatory scheme for the nursing profes-
sion).
117. Dolan v. Galluzzo, 396 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ill. 1979) ("to [allow surgeons to testify to the
standard of care of podiatrists] would not only be unfair to podiatrists ... but it would also as-
sume that science and medicine have achieved a universal standard of treatment of disease or
injury").
118. Sullivan, 806 N.E.2d at 658.
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policy interests behind the medical licensing requirement do not apply
in these cases.
In Petre v. Cardiovascular Consultants, the First District adopted
this moderate approach, invalidating the strict approach endorsed in
Garley.119 The facts of that case began when James Petre had coronary
bypass surgery on November 26, 1996.120 Mr. Petre developed an in-
fection while under the care of his treating physician, but it went unno-
ticed and the physician released Mr. Petre from the hospital on
December 2.121 Over a month later, Mr. Petre underwent a second sur-
gery to cure the infection, which resulted in the loss of his sternum,
which in turn necessitated plastic surgery to reconstruct the shape of
his chest.122
At trial, Mr. Petre's treating physician, Dr. Kucich, testified that a
culture was taken from the fluid from Mr. Petre's incision shortly after
the first operation.123 However, Dr. Kucich only learned of the culture
result, which was positive for a bacterial infection, much later, which
indicates that there was a missed communication between a nurse or
staff member and Dr. Kucich.124 Dr. Kucich testified that "[i]f my office
knew and didn't tell someone, then yeah, there's a breach of standard
of care."125 Thus, this case concerned the required communications
between a nurse or staff member and the patient's treating physician,
falling "squarely within the exception to the licensing requirement
articulated in Wingo."126
By adopting a moderate application of Sullivan and endorsing the
Wingo exception, the First District in Petre explicitly overturned Garley,
which had adopted a strict application of Sullivan.127 The court based
its decision to overturn Garley on its own interpretation of the Sullivan
holding: "Sullivan very clearly distinguished Wingo because it found
that the 'precise factual scenario' of communications between a nurse
and a physician was not present in that case."128 Therefore, the Petre
119. Petre v. Cardiovascular Consultants, 871 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
120. Id at 784.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 786.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 787.
126. Id.at 793.
127. Id. at 792 ("We therefore disagree with Justice Quinn's opinion in Garley on this point
and find Wingo to remain appropriate precedent for this court to follow"). For an analysis of the
Garley opinion, see infra pp. 259-62.
128. Petre, 871 N.E.2d at 792.
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court reasoned that Sullivan intended to leave the Wingo exception
intact.
However, it was improper for the Petre court to base its decision
on the factual differences between Wingo and Sullivan. Although the
factual situation of nurse-doctor communications was not presented at
trial in Sullivan, it does not follow that the Sullivan court was silent on
this issue. In fact, the Sullivan court was not silent. In its extensive poli-
cy analysis of the importance of the original licensing requirements,
the Sullivan court explained that a nurse could not testify that when
she calls a physician, the physician usually responds in a certain
way.129 Such testimony would be inadmissible because it would
amount to a nurse determining the physician's standard of care for
nurse-doctor communications.130 At the very least, this analysis shows
that a physician's communications to a nurse fall under the purview of
a physician's standard of care. Moreover, since the Sullivan court em-
phasized that nursing is a distinct, yet equal profession, it would follow
that the court believed that the reverse is also true: a nurse's commu-
nication to a physician is a nursing procedure governed by the nursing
standard of care. The Petre court's dismissive account of Sullivan failed
to recognize the Sullivan court's implication that strict licensing re-
quirements would nullify the Wingo exception.
After dismissing this implication and explaining that it would
adopt a moderate interpretation of Sullivan, the Petre court began its
analysis of the case at hand. The court structured its analysis around
the Purtill foundational test. First, regarding the licensing require-
ments, the court stated, "Wingo relieves a party of satisfying the licens-
ing prong of the Purtill foundational test where the allegations of
negligence concern communications between members of different
schools of medicine acting as part of the same team."131 Therefore,
since the allegation of negligence in this case concerned what a nurse
or staff member should have told Dr. Kucich about Petre's culture, the
"plaintiff is relieved of satisfying the licensing requirement of the Pur-
till foundational test."132
While discussing the policy implications of its decision, the Petre
court stated that licensing requirements need not apply in cases con-
129. Sullivan v. Edward Hosp., 806 N.E.2d 645, 658 (1ll. 2004) (Sullivan Amicus Br., supra note
65).
130. Id
131. Petre, 871 N.E.2d at 792 (citing Wingo ex rel. Wingo v. Rockford Mem'I Hosp., 686 N.E.2d




cerning nurse-doctor communications because "the problem of impos-
ing a higher standard of care on a defendant is not present where there
is no different standard between the proffered expert's school of medi-
cine and the school of medicine to which the defendant belongs."133
However, the court failed to explain why the physician standard of care
would always match the nursing standard of care in cases involving a
communication. To the contrary, the case law indicates that nurses and
doctors can disagree about the communication standard of care. To
illustrate, even the Garley case that Petre overturned presented a dif-
ference of opinion between the two schools of medicine: the physician
experts testified that the nurses should have contacted the physician if
they could not ambulate the patient within 12 to 18 hours of surgery,
whereas the nurse expert testified that the nurses need not contact the
physician until 24 hours had passed.134 Therefore, the Petre court's
conclusory policy analysis failed to explain why nurses and physicians
should share a common communication standard of care in court, giv-
en that they do not do so in practice.
Further, in applying the Wingo exception to the facts of this case,
the Petre court overlooked a subtle yet important factual difference
between Wingo, on the one hand, and Petre and Garley, on the other. In
Wingo, the nurse had most likely talked to the physician about the pa-
tient's leaking bag of waters, and the controversy concerned the
nurse's failure to communicate the message in a manner the physician
understood.135 In Petre and Garley, no communication occurred at all,
whether effective or not.136 In other words, the central question in
Petre and Garley was, "When should a nurse summon the doctor?"
whereas the central question in Wingo was, "How should a nurse
communicate information to the doctor?" Thus, the question presented
in Petre and Garley pertains to nursing procedures even more so than
the question in Wingo. While the method of communication between
nurses and physicians could conceivably fall within either profession-
al's standard of care, the procedure for determining when to call the
physician is plainly a nursing procedure governed by the nursing
standard of care. For example, in Petre, what if the nursing standard of
care only required the nurse to record the culture test results in Mr.
Petre's chart, under the expectation that the physician standard of care
133. Id.at793.
134. See Garley, 813 N.E.2d at 1034-35.
135. See Wingo, 686 N.E.2d at 725-27.
136. See Petre, 871 N.E.2d at 790, 793; Garley, 813 N.E.2d at 1033-34.
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required Dr. Kucich to check the chart daily? If this were true, then it
would be grossly unfair for a physician to testify that the nursing
standard of care required the nurse to communicate that information
orally when the nurse's own training informed her that recording it in
the chart was sufficient.
Ultimately, in the Petre case, Dr. Kucich did not have the oppor-
tunity to testify as such because his proposed testimony did not pass
the second prong of the Purtill foundational test, which requires the
expert to be familiar with the methods of the defendant's professional
community.137 The Petre court emphasized that, although Wingo al-
lows experts to bypass the licensing prong of the test, the expert "must
still satisfy the second prong of the Purtill test by establishing that the
allegations of negligence were within that expert's knowledge and ex-
perience."138 In a "sharp contrast" to Wingo, in which the physician
expert witnesses had taught obstetric nurses and worked with nurses
in team settings, Dr. Kucich "never established that he was familiar
with the methods, procedures, and treatments ordinarily observed by
other staff or employees."139 Thus, since Dr. Kucich failed to meet the
second prong of the Purtill foundational test, he could not testify to the
standard of care for nurses or other staff members.
Therefore, while the Petre case embodies a moderate application
of Sullivan, it ultimately fails to resolve the tension between Sullivan's
endorsement of licensing requirements and Wingo's disregard for
those requirements in the limited sphere of nurse-doctor communica-
tions. In short, Petre states its conclusion without explaining why the
important policy concerns that gave rise to the licensing requirements
are irrelevant when analyzing the communications between nurses
and physicians.
III. ARGUMENT
Of the three possible interpretations of the Sullivan case, the First
District's ruling in Garley is the only one that preserves the goals of tort
law while ensuring that nurse defendants are granted a fair trial. This
section first discusses the history of medical standards of care and
explores the rationale for allowing the medical profession to set its
137. Petre, 871 N.E.2d at 793. See also Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872-73 (Ill. 1986) (es-
tablishing the Purtill foundation test).
138. Petre, 871 N.E.2d at 792 (citing Wingo ex rel. Wingo v. Rockford Mem'1 Hosp., 686 N.E.2d
722, 729 (111. App. Ct. 1997)).
139. Id at 793.
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own standards. Second, this section explains why the original Dolan
licensing requirements are necessary in the area of nursing malprac-
tice. Third, it explains that the text of the Sullivan opinion strongly
supports abolishing the Wingo exception as the First District did in
Garley. Fourth, this section analyzes the policy implications of the three
possible approaches in the wake of Sullivan, and concludes that a strict
application of Sullivan is the best compromise between ensuring fair-
ness for nurse defendants and promoting the two goals of tort law,
compensation and deterrence. Finally, this section argues that liability
for failed nurse-doctor communications should ultimately fall on the
physician as the least-cost avoider.
A. The History of Medical Standards of Care
Medical professionals have the unique benefit in tort law of set-
ting their own legal standards of care. In ordinary negligence cases, the
jury must decide whether the defendant acted like a reasonable per-
son: "Arguably, any lay person can apply this standard and assess
whether a defendant's conduct was what a reasonable person would or
should have done."140 In medical malpractice cases, however, the jury's
task is to assess whether the medical professional acted in compliance
with a specific standard of care, which is based on "customary and
usual practices within the profession."141 Since these standards of care
are not intuitive to laypeople, medical experts must educate the jury
about the custom and practice in the defendant's professional medical
community. Then, the jury must decide, based on these experts' testi-
mony, whether the defendant's conduct met the standard of care. In
short, the medical community may set its own "reasonable person"
standard based on what professionals usually do in a given situation,
regardless of whether that custom is objectively reasonable. The jury
generally may not substitute its own understanding of reasonableness
for the standard of care offered in expert testimony.142
140. Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in Medicine,
23 J. LEGAL MED. 449,471 (2002).
141. Paul M. Coltoff et al., Professional Standard of Care or Conduct, 65 C.I.S. NEGLIGENCE § 163
(2011).
142. Id. There are two main exceptions where the jury can substitute its own judgment for
that of the experts: "[1] custom and practice are not controlling in negligence cases in which a
layperson can infer negligence by a professional without any expert testimony and [21 where the
profession has lagged behind in adopting reasonable safety procedures, adherence to a profes-
sional custom is not conclusive on the issue of negligence." Id To use the first exception, the
professional's negligence must be "so grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty
recognizing it." Matson v. Naifeh, 595 P.2d 38, 40 (Ariz. 1979).
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This different standard for medical professionals reflects both the
historical development of medical malpractice law and the modern
difficulty of forcing lay jurors to rule on the reasonableness of complex
medical procedures. Historically, the relaxed standard of care for med-
ical professionals arose from society's reverence for healers and com-
passion for country doctors without access to the latest scientific
knowledge. In today's world of standardized medical education and
complicated medical procedures requiring great expertise, the profes-
sional standard acknowledges that what is reasonable in medicine is
outside most jurors' ken.
Historians can trace the relationship of medicine and law to the
Middle Ages. Before the Black Plague swept through England in the
1300s, physicians enjoyed an "absolute" occupational privilege "pro-
tecting them against any liability for negligent injury or death."143 Dur-
ing the Plague epidemic, physicians' liability changed to reflect the
nature of the public emergency. Physicians who refused to treat pa-
tients could be liable for nonfeasance (not performing a required
act).144 However, since society desperately needed treatment, it re-
fused to hold physicians liable for misfeasance (performing an act im-
properly).145
By the early 1400s, the English legal system began to draw dis-
tinctions between contract and tort law.146 Contract cases were based
on nonfeasance, while tort cases were based on misfeasance, which
relied on a variation of the reasonable person standard.147 A separate
category of cases, "action[s] upon the case for negligence," applied to
people who breached specific duties "imposed by law" or based upon
"customs of the realm."148 The law did not hold a skilled professional
liable for misfeasance, since ordinary people could not determine what
conduct was reasonable for a skilled professional.149 Therefore, in-
jured patients had to rely on the doctrine of negligence to hold physi-
cians accountable, even though there were few regulatory standards in
place at that time.1so
143. Charles Markowitz, M.D., Medical Standard of Care jurisprudence as Evolutionary Process:
Implications Under Managed Care, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 59, 61 (2001).
144. Id.
145. Id.







In 1518, King Henry VIII founded the Royal College of Physicians
and Surgeons.1st The purpose of the Royal College was to allow the
medical profession to police itself.152 It granted licenses to qualified
physicians and punished unqualified ones, and it could fine or impris-
on professionals who violated the college's regulations.1s3 Board
members acted as both police officers and judges: they could both in-
vestigate physician and pharmacist malpractice and punish offend-
ers.154 This self-regulatory privilege was a sign of elevated social
status.iss
Yet, recorded medical malpractice lawsuits remained scarce until
the nineteenth century.156 Perhaps due to a sustained reverence for
healers, these nineteenth century cases deferred to the medical profes-
sions by allowing them to establish their own standards of care. In
Lanphier v. Phipos, the court held that a professional's reasonable skill
is "not [the] highest possible degree of skill."157 The Rich v. Pierpont
court was even more deferential, holding that "[t]here must have been
a want of competent and ordinary care and skill, and to such a degree
as to have led to a bad result."Is8
In the United States, nineteenth century medical malpractice law
also deferred to the professions' customs in determining standards of
care. In McCandless v. McWha, the court defined the standard of care as
the obligation "to treat the case with diligence and skill... such rea-
sonable skill and diligence, as are ordinarily exercised in [the] profes-
sion... such as thoroughly educated surgeons ordinarily employ."159
American courts were especially deferential to custom because the
westward migration across the continent "brought with it significant
discrepancies in resources and skill between urban and rural provid-
ers."160 Hence, the "locality rule" was born.161 This rule held that in
medical malpractice cases, the defendant's conduct should not be com-
pared to that of a reasonable person, but rather the customs and prac-
151. Id.
152. Id. at 62-63.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 63.
155. ld. at 63.
156. Id. at 64.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 22 Pa. 261, 267-68 (Pa. 1853) (emphasis added). See also Allan H. McCoid, The Care
Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 550 (1959).
160. Sokol & Molzen, supra note 140, at 474.
161. Id. at 476.
2692012]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tices of other medical professionals in the same community.162 Thus, in
order to avoid liability, rural doctors with poor skills and little equip-
ment only needed to practice medicine as well as other rural doctors
with the same limitations.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, both the
need for the locality rule and society's reverence for physicians fad-
ed,163 but a different rationale for the self-policing of medical stand-
ards arose: the complexity of medical science. This complexity has two
sources. First, evaluating the reasonableness of most medical proce-
dures requires a degree of scientific knowledge that is beyond laypeo-
ple's understanding. Second, the urgent nature of emergency care
renders the reasonableness standard flexible and relative. For exam-
ple, the standard of care might require a young resident surgeon to
perform an emergency surgery if there is no attending surgeon on call,
even if it would be negligent for the resident surgeon to attempt the
surgery under normal circumstances.164 These two factors - the sci-
entific complexity of medicine and the quick decision-making of emer-
gency care - render the "reasonableness" of any medical
professional's actions unknowable without expert testimony.
In medical malpractice cases today, Illinois courts usually defer to
the standards of care set by the medical professions. When the conduct
in question is governed by uniform standards of medical practice, then
any medical expert may testify to the standard of care as long as that
expert holds the same license as the defendant. However, if the facili-
ties themselves are relevant to determining whether the defendant
acted reasonably, than an expert may only testify to the standard of
care if that expert is "acquainted with accepted standards of care under
similar circumstances."165 Finally, one Illinois court has held that the
jury may substitute its own standard of care if the standard established
by the medical profession is deficient.166 In those rare situations, the
162. Id.
163. Id. at 477 (The modern standard of care "evaluat[es] physician conduct... based on the
unquestioned assumption that access to information technology is relatively uniform and that
national customs of practice actually exist"); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to
Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 196 (2000) ("Since 1966,
the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research has tracked how confident Americans are about
leaders in various fields. In the initial year of the survey, Americans had a 73% level of confidence
in medicine, well above the average for other fields (40%). However, the confidence level in
medicine has decreased fairly steadily ever since and in 1993 was at an all time low of 22%.").
164. Steven E. Pegalis, Physician and Surgeon Liability: Standard of care, generally, 1 AM. LAW
MED. MALP. § 3:3 (2011).
165. Id.
166. Lundahl v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 235 N.E.2d 671, 763 (111. App. Ct. 1968).
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court held that "although a treatment was usual or customary, a de-
fendant would not be absolved of liability on that basis alone where
the customary practice itself might be negligent."167 However, unless
the entire profession is clearly acting carelessly or recklessly, the court
should not interpose its own standard of care on the medical commu-
nity.168
While the medical professions do have the privilege of setting
their own standards of care, it is not clear that these standards are in
fact different from the reasonable person standard. Both the ordinary
and professional standards impose "the obligation to provide due care
commensurate with the risk posed by the conduct, taking into consid-
eration all relevant circumstances, with the amount of care deemed
reasonable varying and depending upon the particular case."169 Ac-
cordingly, "[t]he word 'reasonable' permeates any discussion of ...
professional liability"; a physician is judged against the "degree of
knowledge and concomitant medical or surgical skill that a physician
under the same or similar circumstances should 'reasonably' pos-
sess."17o The nursing profession is bound by a similar "reasonableness"
standard: a nurse is required "to possess that reasonable degree of
learning, skill, and experience ordinarily possessed by others of the
profession, and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence
in the exertion of her skill and the application of her knowledge, and to
exert her best judgment as to the treatment of the case entrusted to
her."171 The standard of care, then, simply requires professionals to
reasonably apply their skills to the facts at hand.
The only difference between the ordinary and professional stand-
ards lies in the jury's ability to determine what is reasonable. Because
the medical professions rely on scientific knowledge and must make
informed decisions in emergency settings, those professions must edu-
cate the jury on what constitutes reasonable action in a given situation.
Further, since each medical profession relies on different scientific
training and plays a different role in caring for patients, only a person
licensed in a certain school of medicine may educate the jury on that
school's standards of care.172 These rules for setting the standard of
167. Id.
168. Locality Rule, 22 ILL. PRAC., THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS § 23:7 (3d ed.).
169. Coltoff, supra note 141.
170. Pegalis, supra note 164.
171. David R. Gee, Nurse's Failure to Give Physician Timely Notice of Patient's Condition, 25 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 411 § 5 (1981).
172. Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (lll. 1986).
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care enable juries to make informed decisions about whether a medical
professional's conduct was reasonable in light of scientific advances
and limitations.
B. The Necessity of Licensing Requirements in Nursing Malpractice
Before examining the specifics of how licensing requirements
should apply in the limited arena of cross-discipline communications,
it is important to discuss why licensing requirements were an appro-
priate development in the first place. Medical malpractice is the only
area in Illinois law where an expert's licensure goes to the admissibil-
ity of the testimony rather than merely its weight. Additionally, Illinois
is one of the only states that has a same-license requirement for medi-
cal expert testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court in Dolan presented a
comprehensive policy analysis for why licensing requirements are
necessary in medical malpractice generally.173 More specifically,
though, it is crucial for Illinois courts to maintain separate licensing
requirements for physicians and nurses in recognition of nursing as a
distinct profession.
First, it is well established by Illinois courts, the state legislature,
and the nursing profession itself that nursing is a distinct profession
with unique responsibilities and treatment philosophies. For instance,
the Journal of Nursing has tracked the evolution of the profession from
subordinancy to independence: in the past, nurses simply provided
care and comfort, but the modern nurse "is a client advocate, educator,
and manager."174 Yet, the antiquated public perception of nurses as
lowly doctors' assistants could undermine the credibility of nurse ex-
pert witnesses in court.175 Jurors might improperly grant a physician's
testimony more weight than a nurse's, even though the nurse would
have a more accurate working knowledge of the nursing standard of
care.
Unfavorable or inaccurate perceptions of nurses are well docu-
mented both among physicians and in society at large. Among physi-
173. Dolan v. Galluzzo, 396 N.E.2d 13,16 (lll. 1979).
174. American Society of Registered Nurses, The Real Public Perception of Nurses, J. OF
NURSING, Dec. 1, 2007, http://www.asrn.org/journal-nursing/249-the-real-public-perception-of-
nurses.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
175. Sandy Summers, The Image of Nursing: The Handmaiden, NURSING TIMEs, Oct. 7, 2010,
http://www.nursingtimes.net/nursing-practice/clinical-specialisms/management/the-image-of-
nursing-the-handmaiden/5020163.article (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) ("the popular media.. still




cians, one of the latest battles is the effort to reclaim exclusive control
of the honorific "doctor," even though a growing number of nurses are
earning doctorate degrees in nursing. This degree is an attractive op-
tion for nurses because it can "help them land a top administrative job
at a hospital, improve their standing at a university and win them more
respect from colleagues and patients."176 Physicians, however, are
pushing back. Laws in Arizona and Delaware prevent Ph.D. nurses
from using the "doctor" title unless they immediately identify them-
selves as nurses, and the New York Senate is currently considering a
similar law.177 Another struggle is over who should see patients first.
Physicians argue that their extensive training grants them the exclu-
sive right to diagnose illnesses; however, studies prove that nurses
"are perfectly capable of recognizing a vast majority of patient prob-
lems."178 While physicians and nurses often cooperate on patient care,
not all physicians are willing to accept that nurses "train, manage, and
regulate themselves ... [and] have independent legal and ethical duties
to patients."179
Likewise, lay jurors are probably influenced by negative stereo-
types of the nursing profession. In its series of articles on the image of
nursing, Nursing Times examines the television meme of physicians
making bold orders and nurses meekly responding, "[Y]es, doctor!"1so
This stereotypical interaction has significant implications for the
Wingo rule because it is the only type of nurse-doctor communication
with which many jurors are familiar. Nursing Times writes, "[t]he vast
majority of nurse appearances [on television] involve a character pop-
ping up out of nowhere to absorb a physician command, usually in
silence; compliance is assumed."181 The article additionally asserts that
this "handmaiden" stereotype has polluted real healthcare workplac-
es.182 Not only do physicians wield more social and economic power
than nurses, but nurses also suffer "disproportionately high levels of
violence and psychological abuse by patients."183
176. Gardiner Harris, When the Nurse Wants to Be Called 'Doctor, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 1,
2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/health/policy/02docs.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=
PhD%20nursing&st=cse (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
177. Id.
178. Id.







The Hollywood portrayal of nursing allows one to reasonably the-
orize that the public could have adopted these negative stereotypes,
and the record of nurse abuse by patients demonstrates a true negative
perception, whether influenced by Hollywood or not. Because juries of
laypeople judge nurse defendants in court, the Dolan licensing re-
quirements are necessary to ensure that nurses receive fair trials. Even
if jurors do not view nurses unfavorably, the public perception of nurs-
es as physicians' subordinates might make jurors more inclined to
trust a physician's testimony than a nurse's, even when the testimony
is used to establish the nursing standard of care. Furthermore, since
jurors may imagine nurse-doctor communications as a one-way street
of commands and acquiescence, they may be disinclined to trust a
nurse's opinion that the failure of communication originated with the
physician. The licensing requirements are necessary to ensure that
jurors base their decisions on the credibility of the testimony rather
than on misplaced notions of physician superiority. In short, these re-
quirements could help reduce the structural disadvantages that nurse
defendants face in court.
Furthermore, the Dolan licensing requirements are a necessary
safeguard against physicians dishonestly shifting blame onto nurses. In
many cases concerning a flawed nurse-doctor communication, either
the nurse or the physician is to blame.184 However, physicians are gen-
erally reluctant to testify against each other; in fact, this phenomenon
is so prevalent that courts have dubbed it the "conspiracy of si-
lence."185 In 1970, the Arkansas Supreme Court wrote, "It is a matter of
common knowledge... that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case
is unable to find a medical expert willing to testify against a fellow phy-
sician... [which] poses the possibility of great miscarriage of jus-
tice."186 Fortunately, this conspiracy of silence has greatly receded
184. Consider several of the Illinois cases cited in this article - Wingo, Sullivan, Petryshyn,
Petre, and Garley. In each of these cases, a nurse and a physician were pitted against each other
because one of these professionals was likely the source of negligent conduct.
185. DIETER GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL-MALPRACTICE LAW 513 (1988). See, e.g., Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Bd. Trustees, 317 P.2d. 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (calling the phenomenon a
"conspiracy of silence"); Morris v. Metriyakool, 309 N.W.2d. 810 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (same).
Various courts have also dubbed this phenomenon the "community of silence," Crain v. Allison,
445 A.2d 558, 561-62 (D.C. 1982); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021-22 (Md. 1977); Wilkinson
v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (R.I. 1972), the "well recognized fraternal comradeship in the medical
profession", Application of Weiss, 147 N.Y.S.2d. 455, 456 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), and "an affirmative
custom to maintain silence," Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d. 772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
186. Graham v. Sisco, 449 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Ark. 1970). See also Faulkner v. Pezeshki, 337
N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) ("Locating an expert to testify for the plaintiff in a malprac-
tice action is known to be a very difficult task, mainly because in most cases, one doctor is reluc-
tant and unwilling to testify against another doctor. Although doctors may complain privately to
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because the creation of national medical standards means that physi-
cians no longer need to testify against their local colleagues.
However, a South Carolina Law Review article written before
these reforms noted that, although nurses and physicians often worked
together, there was no conspiracy of silence protecting the nursing
profession.187 At that time, physicians often supplied the expert testi-
mony to establish the nursing standard of care. Despite the conspiracy
of silence shrouding the physician community, there was no shortage
of physician experts willing to testify against nurses.188 This trend
shows that if given the choice today, physicians are probably much
more likely to testify against nurses than fellow physicians. In cases
concerning failed communications, where nurses are pitted against
physicians, nurses may find it more difficult to obtain a physician wit-
ness willing to testify that she followed the nursing standard of care.
This unwillingness of physicians to defend nurses, combined with ju-
rors' inclination to trust physicians, could lead to the unfair result of
physicians pinning liability on nurses simply because they are in a bet-
ter position to procure a fellow physician's expert testimony.
The Dolan licensing requirements eliminate all of these structural
disadvantages against nurse defendants by requiring physicians to
establish the physician standard of care and nurses to establish the
nursing standard of care. This rule is the only result that adequately
ensures that nursing is treated fairly in court as a distinctly valuable
profession.
C The Neglected Text of Sullivan
The text of the Sullivan opinion strongly indicates that the Illinois
Supreme Court intended to abolish the Wingo exception. Although the
Sullivan court did not expressly rule on the standard of care for nurse-
doctor communications, one passage in the opinion actually does
speak to this factual situation. However, no lower court opinion in the
wake of Sullivan has identified this passage when discussing Sullivan's
effect on the Wingo exception.
After reaffirming the Dolan licensing requirements, the Sullivan
court acknowledged that nursing is a distinct and unique medical pro-
each other about the incompetence of other doctors, they are extremely reluctant to air the mat-
ter publicly.").
187. Victoria L. Miller, Court Rejects Fixed Locality Rule for Nurses, Adopts National Standard of




fession.189 The court also emphasized that allowing doctors to testify
about nursing would improperly assume that the diverse medical pro-
fessions have reached a universal understanding.19o Then, quoting The
American Association of Nurse Attorneys (TAANA), the Sullivan court
stated:
Certainly, nurses are not permitted to offer expert testimony against
a physician based on their observances of physicians or their famili-
arity with the procedures involved. An operating room nurse, who
stands shoulder to shoulder with surgeons every day, would not be
permitted to testify as to the standard of care of a surgeon ... A labor
and delivery nurse would not be permitted to offer expert, opinion
testimony as to the standard of care for an obstetrician or even a
midwife. Nor would a nurse be permitted to testify that, in her experi-
ence, when she calls a physician, he/she usually responds in a certain
manner. Such testimony would be, essentially, expert testimony as to
the standard of medical care.191
This quote first implies that required communications fall within a
medical professional's standard of care and should not be held to a
different standard than any other job-related procedure. Next, the
quote states that nurses cannot testify that physicians usually respond
a certain way during cross-discipline communications. Since Illinois
courts recognize physicians and nurses as distinct professions, the
converse of all of this quotation's examples should be true: physicians
cannot testify to nursing procedures just as nurses cannot testify to
physician procedures.
Following directly from this logic, a physician should not be al-
lowed to testify that when he asks a nurse to convey some vital com-
munication, she should respond in a certain manner. This
interpretation of the quoted text, fully recognizing the uniqueness of
the nursing profession, leaves no room for the Wingo exception. In-
deed, such an exception could only be founded in logic if one believed
that nurses were simply inferior physicians' assistants rather than
members of a separate profession with unique methods and philoso-
phies of treatment. Such an interpretation has no place in the Sullivan
decision, and the TAANA quotation indicates that the Wingo exception
has no place in the post-Sullivan era, either.
189. Sullivan v. Edward Hosp., 806 N.E.2d 645, 658 (111. 2004).
190. Id. at 654, 658.
191. Id. at 658 (Sullivan Amicus Br., supra note 65 (emphasis added)).
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D. Balancing Compensation and Deterrence
Legal scholars have long recognized two major goals of the tort
system, compensation and deterrence. The compensation goal focuses
on the plaintiff: "[t]he function of compensation is to reimburse a vic-
tim for her losses from the tortious act, and to restore her to the condi-
tion before the act."192 This is sometimes described as making the
plaintiff whole again. The deterrence goal, on the other hand, focuses
on the defendant and other potential tortfeasors: "[d]eterrence is the
function of tort law by which the law creates incentives that induce
people to avoid inappropriately dangerous activities."193 Often ex-
pressed in economic game theory terms, deterrence theories "assume
that rational potential tortfeasors weigh the costs and benefits of their
actions, and that they take only actions whose benefits exceed the
costS."194 Each of the three applications of Sullivan would create differ-
ent results with respect to these two goals of tort law. For purposes of
the below analysis, it is assumed that physician expert witnesses
would establish a higher and more rigorous nursing standard of care
than nurse experts would.
Under the lenient approach endorsed in Petryshyn, the patient
may receive a higher compensation award, but not because of any true
difference in liability. In cases where medical professionals, working in
a team setting, injure a patient, one or more of those medical profes-
sionals may have been negligent. This was the case, for example, in the
Petryshyn case itself, where both the nurses and the surgeon were like-
ly negligent for failing to remove the IUPC from the patient's birth ca-
nal. If physicians are allowed to testify to the nursing standard of care
in these situations, imposing a higher standard of care on the nurse
defendants after the fact, this could ultimately shift responsibility away
from the physicians and onto the hospital that employs the nurses.19s
This blame-shifting could allow plaintiffs to obtain higher com-
pensation awards. Data shows that, on average, plaintiffs receive high-
192. Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910 (2008).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Richard J. Kohlman, Hospital Liability for Nursing Medication Errors, 29 AM. JUR. TRIALS
591 § 11 (1982) ("There is little doubt today that the professional negligence of an employed
nurse will subject the nurse's hospital-employer to vicarious liability for his or her malpractice
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.")
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er damage awards from hospitals than from individual physicians.196
Studies also indicate that, even where injuries are substantially the
same, juries are more willing to award higher damages against hospi-
tals than against physicians.197 Therefore, if the lenient approach al-
lows physicians to shift liability to nurses who are hospital employees,
this could result in greater compensation for plaintiffs.
However, although injured plaintiffs may obtain higher compensa-
tion awards from hospitals via nurse defendants under the lenient
approach, this does not indicate that nurse defendants were actually
more liable in causing plaintiffs' injuries. The fact that physicians may
use societal advantages to shift responsibility onto nurse defendants
has no bearing on whether a nurse's manner of conveying information
comported with that nurse's training. It is quite possible that even
when a physician's misunderstanding was the sole source of the
breach, physician expert witnesses could convince the jury that the
nurse was at fault. This, in turn, would allow negligent physicians to
continue practicing with a clean record, while nurses who followed
their standards of care would be held liable. Therefore, although plain-
tiffs may receive higher awards under this lenient approach, these
higher awards do not represent an actual shift in liability, but rather
manipulation by physician defendants avoiding responsibility.
This lenient approach would certainly influence potential tortfea-
sors' behavior, but probably not in a way that would improve patient
care. The lenient approach would not actually raise the standard of
care of the negligent party. Rather, since nurses could be judged in
court against physicians' expectations, hospitals would likely force
nurses to take precautionary measures to ensure that their conduct
196. A study of Texas medical malpractice verdicts between 1988 and 2003 illustrates this
phenomenon. David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay WhatJuries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts
in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 27 (2007). Comparing
cases where a plaintiff either sued one hospital or one physician, the data revealed that the mean
damage award was 45 percent higher, the mean adjusted verdict was 56 percent higher, and the
actual payout was 81 percent higher where the plaintiff sued the hospital. Id. Furthermore, com-
paring cases where plaintiffs sued two or more physicians with cases where plaintiffs sued a
physician and a hospital, the mean damage award was 71 percent higher, the mean adjusted
verdict was 62 percent higher, and the mean actual payout was 113 percent higher where a
hospital was a named defendant. Id.
197. In an experiment, 147 jury members were asked to award damages in three hypothet-
ical cases involving a broken femur. Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothe-
sis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 241 (1993).
In the first scenario, the plaintiff sued one anesthesiologist. Id. at 244-45. In the second, she sued
both an anesthesiologist and a surgeon. Id. at 245. In the third, she sued the hospital for the negli-
gence of its orderlies. Id. The mean damage award against the anesthesiologist was $99,950,
against the two physicians, $67,709, and against the hospital, $114,339. Id at 247.
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could not be misunderstood. Rather than enhancing patient care, these
precautionary measures could simply increase bureaucracy and inter-
rupt the atmosphere of cooperation governing teams. For example,
nurses might take time away from patient care to explain each of their
actions to the team physicians, take detailed records of every action,
and follow up to ensure that the physicians read the charts and logs.
Rather than reducing the number of mistakes made, these precautions
would merely be measures to reduce the hospital's liability if an injury
occurred. Compiling such detailed records would take a significant
amount of time-time that could have been spent on patient care. Fur-
ther, even if these precautions have the effect of reducing mistakes,
this is not a fair way to accomplish the deterrence goal because only
the nursing standard of care would be raised, not the standard of every
professional team member. This increase in the nursing standard
would be especially unfair because nurses were not necessarily more
prone to act negligently than the physicians on their teams. Therefore,
any gains in patient care are negated by the increased bureaucracy and
unfairness to nurses created by this rule.
The moderate approach endorsed by Petre entails the same effects
on compensation as the lenient approach. In most cases where a nurse-
doctor communication failure caused an injury, either the nurse or the
physician was negligent. Allowing physicians to establish the nursing
standard would simply make it easier for the court to find nurses lia-
ble, thus potentially shifting the plaintiffs source of compensation
from the true negligent party to the nurse. If both parties met their
respective standards of care and the communication still failed, the
correct solution is to change the standard of care, not to hold liable a
nurse who followed correct procedure.
In terms of deterrence, the moderate approach actually creates
perverse incentives for physicians to claim that they did not under-
stand the nurses who communicated with them. If the nursing stand-
ard of care for communications requires the nurse to relay information
in a way that the physician prefers, this is the equivalent of declaring
that if the physician did not understand, then the nurse breached the
standard of care. To avoid liability, hospitals would place the onus on
their nurses to ensure that every physician understands them correctly
and completely. While this could have the positive effect of requiring
nurses to verify physicians' understanding, it still creates an incentive
for physicians to claim after the fact that they did not understand in
order to avoid liability.
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The strict application, which the Garley court endorsed, is the best
approach regarding both deterrence and fairness to nurse defendants.
Since physicians could not use structural advantages to artificially shift
liability onto nurses, more physicians would likely be held accountable
for misunderstandings that amounted to breaches of the physician
standard of care. While it is true that plaintiffs generally receive lower
damage awards from physicians than hospitals, the higher awards they
could potentially gain from the other two approaches are not based on
actual liability, but rather artificially shifted blame. In terms of deter-
rence, the strict application would properly deter physicians from plac-
ing the blame of a communication failure on nurses who had followed
proper procedure. It would also eliminate the perverse incentives pre-
sent in the other two approaches for physicians to claim that they did
not understand communications. The strict approach would not create
perverse incentives or unfair advantages for nurses, in contrast to the
advantages that the other two approaches create for physicians. Ra-
ther, the outcome would be fair, since both parties would be judged by
their peers.
E. The Physician as Least-Cost Avoider
If a failed nurse-doctor communication causes a patient harm, but
both the nurse and the physician followed their respective standards of
care, modern medical malpractice law offers the plaintiff no relief. The
correct solution to this problem is not to place liability on the nurse
because it is easy to mischaracterize her standard of care through phy-
sician expert testimony. Rather, the correct solution is to change the
standard of care. This section argues that the physician standard of
care should require physicians to affirmatively correct miscommunica-
tions because physicians, rather than nurses, are in the best position to
do so.
The liability for a failed nurse-doctor communication should fall
on the physician because he is the least-cost avoider. This conclusion
arises from the efficiency model of tort law. This model, proposed by
scholars in the field of law and economics, reasons that civil liability
should fall with the "least-cost avoider,"198 the party who is in the best
position to discover and remedy a hazardous situation.199 The case law
shows that there are two main types of failed nurse-doctor communi-
198. The least-cost avoider is sometimes called the "cheapest cost avoider."
199. M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the
Lenses of Correctivejustice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (1998).
280 [Vol 88:1
THE WINGO EXCEPTION
cations: (1) cases of miscommunication and (2) cases of failed commu-
nication. In both of these factual scenarios, the physician is the least-
cost avoider. Accordingly, the standard of care for nurse-doctor com-
munications should reflect this.
1. Cases of Miscommunication
The least-cost avoider is "the party best able to control a situa-
tion."200 In the arena of patient care, this party is almost always the
patient's treating physician. The treating physician creates a care plan
for each patient and issues directives consistent with this care plan to
the nurses and other hospital staff.2o1 Therefore, physicians and nurses
have different roles when caring for a common patient: the physician
acts as an expert on that particular patient's needs and treatment
goals, whereas the nurse focuses on performing specific procedures for
a wide variety of patients under her watch.
Law and economics scholars Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Mel-
amed have asserted that economic efficiency requires placing the costs
of accidents "on the party or activity which can most cheaply avoid
them."202 Likewise, Judge Richard A. Posner has reasoned, "we do not
want both tortfeasors to take precautions; we want the lower-cost
accident avoider to do sO."203
An example of least-cost avoider application in modern tort law is
the exception of the learned intermediary in products liability law.
While companies are usually required to provide warnings for the
dangerous products that they sell, pharmaceutical companies are re-
lieved of that burden for most prescription drugs.204 Since the physi-
cian who prescribes these drugs is in a better position than the
pharmaceutical company to decide whether a drug would benefit a
particular patient, and since that physician knows the patient's medical
history, allergies, and usage of other prescription drugs, the physician
bears the responsibility of explaining the drug warnings to the pa-
tient.20s Therefore, "[i]ndividual patients within the class for whom the
pharmaceutical is prescribed benefit therapeutically, and pharmaceu-
200. Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2006).
201. Barbara R. Benninger, Note, Nursing Malpractice - The Nurse's Duty to Follow Orders, 90
W. VA. L. REV. 1291, 1300 (1987-88).
202. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972).
203. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 189 (4th ed. 1992).




tical companies benefit by avoiding the miring inefficiencies ... of pro-
tracted civil litigation."206
The relationship between pharmaceutical companies and physi-
cians mirrors the relationship between physicians and nurses when
analyzing instances of miscommunication. Unlike the pharmaceutical
company or the nurse, who interact with multiple clients, the patient's
treating physician is an expert on that particular patient. When a nurse
communicates information to a physician in a manner that the physi-
cian finds ambiguous, the physician is the least-cost avoider in resolv-
ing the ambiguity. Since the physician is an expert on that patient's
history, the physician is in the best position to ask appropriate clarify-
ing questions in order to apply the new information to the patient's
overall care plan. For example, if a nurse tells a physician that Mr.
Smith has been asleep since two, the physician is in the best position to
know whether it matters if the nurse meant two in the morning or two
in the afternoon. If that detail would be important, then the physician
should have an affirmative duty to clarify the nurse's communication
and direct the patient's care accordingly.
Using this framework, only a licensed nurse may testify to the
nursing standard of care for communications. The nursing standard
would dictate whether the nurse defendant's communication was truly
so ambiguous that it fell below the standard of care. Physicians should
not be able to testify to this standard based only upon whether they
would have considered the nurse's communication to be ambiguous. In
fact, if a physician determines that the communication was ambiguous,
this should not be evidence that the nurse deviated from the standard
of care; rather, it should indicate that the physician was negligent in
failing to clarify, fulfilling his proper role as least-cost avoider.
2. Cases of Failed Communication
The physician is also the least-cost avoider in situations where a
nurse failed to communicate information to a physician. The nursing
standard of care requires the nurse to contact a patient's treating phy-
sician upon the occurrence of certain events. For example, the nurse
may be required to update the physician of the patient's condition after
a certain number of hours, or she may be required to inform the physi-
cian when some event occurs, such as the dilation of a pregnant pa-




physician can change the nursing standard of care for when to call the
physician by instructing the nurse to call him at a specified time or
event. In other words, when deciding when to call the physician, the
nursing standard of care acts as a default standard in the absence of
alternate instructions. If the physician instructs the nurse to call him at
a certain time or upon the occurrence of a certain event, this instruc-
tion trumps the default-nursing standard of care.
Although nursing has evolved into an independent profession,
physicians, as the experts on specific patients, often direct nurses to
perform tasks that a patient's care plan requires. Generally, nurses
have a legal duty to execute a physician's directive, and "failure to car-
ry out a physician's order, as a general rule, is a form of nursing negli-
gence or malpractice."207 Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this
nursing duty, and "the law may require more than blind, rigid, obedi-
ence to a physician's order."208 For example, a nurse would not be
shielded from liability if she obeyed a physician's order knowing that
doing so could harm the patient.209 In certain situations, the law im-
poses duties on nurses "to refrain from carrying out a physician's or-
der, to question the order, and at times to actually disobey a
physician's order."210 In the absence of these extraordinary circum-
stances, however, the nursing standard of care requires nurses to fol-
low physician's instructions on patient care.
In the limited arena of failed nurse-doctor communications, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where a nurse must disobey the physi-
cian's instructions due to safety. For example, if the default-nursing
standard indicates that a nurse should update the doctor on a patient's
condition every six hours, but given the patient's critical condition, the
treating physician directs the nurse to update him every two hours,
this additional responsibility to communicate could not harm the pa-
tient. Thus, when a physician directs a nurse to contact him at a specif-
ic time, this instruction becomes that nurse's standard of care for
communications.
In instances of failed nurse-doctor communications, the physician
is the least-cost avoider because he effectively has the power to control
the nursing standard of care. The strict approach recognizes this. In
207. Frank J. Cavico & Nancy M. Cavico, The Nursing Profession in the 1990's: Negligence and
Malpractice Liability, 43 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 557, 613 (1995).
208. Id.at614.
209. Id. at 615.
210. Id. at 614-15.
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cases where injury may have resulted from a failed nurse-doctor com-
munication, such as Garley, only a licensed nurse should be allowed to
testify to the nursing standard of care. If the patient's treating physi-
cian did not give alternate instructions for when to contact him, then
the default-nursing standard of care should control. On the other hand,
if the physician had directed the nurse to call him at a different time,
the nursing standard of care, as articulated by a nurse expert witness,
would recognize the physician's instruction as controlling. If a nurse
correctly follows the default-nursing standard of care, but an injury
occurs, that nurse should not be held to a different standard at the time
of trial. Rather, if a physician should have directed a nurse to contact
him sooner than the default-nursing standard would indicate, and the
physician's failure to do so resulted in harm, then the liability for that
negligence should fall on the physician as the least-cost avoider.
CONCLUSION
A strict application of the Sullivan ruling which abolishes the
Wingo exception is the only approach that promotes the goals of tort
law while also ensuring that nurse defendants receive a fair trial. The
underlying logic of the Wingo exception - that there is no difference
between the nurse's required disclosures and the physician's expecta-
tions - is fundamentally flawed. Since nursing is a distinct profession
and not merely a doctoring profession with lower standards, the as-
sumption that nurses' and physicians' expectations will align regarding
every communication improperly assumes that the diverse medical
fields have reached a "universal understanding."211 Unfortunately, this
assumption could place a nurse defendant in an unfair position if she
followed the true nursing standard of care, but the physician's failure
to understand the nurse's communication caused an adverse result. A
truly fair result for both plaintiffs and defendants can only be reached
if every party is judged by its own peers. Therefore, Illinois courts
should recognize Garley as the best and most accurate interpretation of
Sullivan, and legal practitioners should advocate for strict licensing
rules that rightfully recognize nursing as a distinct medical profession.
211. Dolan v. Galluzzo, 396 N.E.2d 13, 16 (111. 1979) ("to [allow surgeons to testify to the
standard of care of podiatrists] would not only be unfair to podiatrists ... but it would also as-
sume that science and medicine have achieved a universal standard of treatment of disease or
injury").
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